

DON BURDICK

TAPE 6, Side 1

November 14, 1996

M.O'R.: This is a continuation of the interview with Don Burdick on November 14th, 1996. Go ahead.

D.B.: Well, anyway, so the water was pouring into our canal at 5100 cfs; that does not include the water from our own basin that was coming into the reservoir.

M.O'R.: Which was also elevated, no doubt?

D.B.: Yes, it was high volumes from that source as well. So anyway, 5100 coming in, plus our own basin, and we can only expel about 2400 cfs. So this bifurcation will move that 2400 up to maybe 2760. So we've made about a 15 percent closure of the gap, but we haven't solved it.

The advantage of just that one thing, though, is we can let water out a little faster, so by the time the overtopping occurs we should have a lower elevation in the lake, which gives us a little more reservoir capacity. The extra 360 will slow the rate of rise in our reservoir, and it's a matter of duration. So maybe the overtopping won't be as high as it might otherwise be. But we're still going to get flooded and we're going to get hit, and we know that.

We are thinking about what's called hazard mitigation on our main dam, and that is to cut off a piece of the main dam, right off the top of it, and to install additional stop logs across the top of that main dam that we could just take out and increase the discharge capacity up to the 5100 range, so that at least if we get hit by the same event, we might not be able to do much to protect the upper canal, but we can do a lot to protect the main lake and the bays and the navigation level properly.

We have made application to FEMA to obtain the necessary funds to do that. We would also do some additional earthquake mitigation

at the same time, putting big pins down through the dam to protect against unique earthquake characteristics. We think we're protected now, but the standards today are higher than when we built the dam, and we could solve those.

But FEMA is a very difficult organization to work with when you're a private not-for-profit. Their interpretation of the Congressional recommendation is not always what we think Congress wanted to do, but in our opinion it's worth a try because we think that if we can spend \$155,000 to do this improvement to our dam which will be hazard mitigation, and we will stop \$20 million worth of damages around the lake, that that's a pretty good ratio, and we think it will beat many of the ratios that other municipalities propose for hazard mitigation.

M.O'R.: This might be a place to talk about the way in which all of these events interlock. You mentioned that had you taken the extreme step, which probably nobody was considering seriously, of dynamiting the dam ...

D.B.: No. No, it's interesting cocktail conversation. Someone made the comment about, "Well, did you ever think about just blowing up the dam?" They expect me to say no, but I don't. I say, "Well, yes. We talked about that." It never got to the point of a serious discussion, but we weighed the pro's and con's of it.

M.O'R.: Well, I'm wondering when you're in the middle of a disaster like that, to what extent do you talk with and trade off with other localities whose own situation might be impacted by what you do? I'm thinking that, for instance, there was talk about the fellow operating the Scoggins Dam that the decision was made there to start dumping water because that dam was imperiled, but you know, they took some criticism for doing that because of course that meant there was more water flowing down the Tualatin.

And likewise, if you were able to dump more water off over your dam, then that would mean there would be more water in the Willamette. So how does this work out in a disaster, or how did it work out in the flood of '96 in terms of did you get warning from upstream there at Scoggins that they were going to start dumping water, and did you give any warning to downstream communities on the Willamette? What kind of communication took place?

D.B.: Well, actually that's a very interesting question you ask, and I think that - I've commented several times that someone should write a book about crisis management: what are the things that happen and what are the dynamics of the situation? And they ought to do so with people who have been through crises or been in charge, you know, when a crisis occurred, because I think there's a lot of things to be learned. It's something you have to kind of know about before the crisis occurs to know what are the moves you should take, because oftentimes you only realize it - like a bird flying backwards; you know, you can't exactly see where you're going, but you know where you've been.

That's a very good question. First of all, though, regarding the Scoggins Dam situation, yeah, I think that - there's always a lot of false information and false rumors out there. First of all you have to realize that Scoggins Dam is a very small percentage of the water that comes down the Tualatin. I can't remember the number, but I think it's less than 10 percent. And in point of fact, they actually aided the flood fight because they had some excess capacity at the beginning of the flood, and they held back, without dumping water. They held back till the water got to within a couple of feet - I think it was maybe three feet of the top of Scoggins Dam, and then the choice was either we allow the water to come up and overtop our dam, which could cause a lot of damage to that dam, or we begin to let it out.

So what they did is they were letting out as much as they were taking in, but that really began right around the peak and continued on after the flood. So they were a net holder of water during the total event as opposed to being a discharger. They did discharge, but by that time they were holding everything they could get. It's like a person has a big appetite and they begin to eat a lot, well, they get to a point in their eating where they just can't eat anymore, and they'd better get rid of it because the food is just continuing to come down their throat. And that was the case up at Scoggins, and so to their credit they were making the right moves.

In terms of communication with other agencies, our communication was primarily right here within the Lake Oswego basin; it was the City of Lake Oswego. What I found was that the police department and the fire department were trying to communicate through the emergency communications network, which is one of radios and special broadcast systems and so forth, but the decision making that was really going on between agencies and so forth bypassed that channel and went straight to cellular telephones.

One of the comments is that the only bill that was higher than the flood bill was the cellular phone bill. I know my cellular phone bill typically runs around \$25 to \$30 a month; I'm not much of a user, but I have one. During the month of February, my cellular phone bill was over \$300 because that's what you did: you carried around your cellular phone, and when you had to get somebody, you called them on their cellular phone, and you packed it everywhere.

I remember meetings that were held in the middle of the night up by our headgate when we were worried about it, and there were a dozen people standing around, and the phone would ring, and everybody would grab for their phone. It was like out of an old Western

where they're all drawing their guns. Nobody knew whose phone was ringing, and it might be theirs, and all these hands dove for a pocket as if they were going to pull out a pistol, but they pulled out a cellular phone to see if it was their phone that was ringing. And then people would kind of walk off from the group to answer their phones and discuss whatever it was, and they'd come back to the group and the information was shared. The telephone calls were very short; there was very little chitchat.

It was a decision-making environment, and frankly, there was a certain adrenaline rush going on for at least me, hard to talk about how everybody else felt, but I've been involved in so many business discussions, and they seem to drone on forever, and the meetings, and the planning, and you get bored to tears. Well, there was no boredom in this situation. I mean, people were driving around in their four-wheel drives if they had them and operating off cellular phones and eating snack food and grabbing a couple hours' sleep here and a couple hours' sleep there, and it went on 24 hours a day for three or four days. It was a very interesting thing.

Did we communicate with other agencies? Not a lot. I think the Mayor of our city, you know, had some communication with Portland, and then it would get passed down, you know, what was going on down there. We knew the flood fight was over down there at the time it was still rising out here. But yeah, it was a cellular phone communication environment.

In fact, I have in my notebook here a building list of telephone numbers, and we had all of our phone books and stuff of other people's offices and so forth, but all of sudden we discovered we were communicating by cellular phone, and by the end of this thing I had three pages of cellular phone numbers, and they were all handwritten and not in any particular order, but just a person's

name and a couple of phone calls, and you know, his house and his cellular phone number and what his office was, and it was an amazing environment to operate in.

I think the Corps decision to build a dam, which they did in 12 hours, was - I mean, that was within their capabilities, but we had other capabilities, too. We just made decisions and hoped that we were right.

Some of these people, speaking of communications, they had boards of directors to report to. The City Manager had a Council to report to. There was a guy here in Lake Oswego who was the head of engineering, and he was immobilized by this. He was - I can't quite explain the term - he was paranoid about making any decisions. In the middle of a disaster, decisions had to be made, and the number two guy in the engineering department, it just kind of devolved to him to be making decisions, and he was nervous, I was nervous, other players were nervous because we were making decisions which we felt would be in the best interests of our organizations, but we didn't really have the authority to do it. Our external authority was there; we could tell somebody to do something, and they thought it was the Lake Corporation telling them. But I didn't really have the resolution from my board to be making decisions that had to be made.

I kept checking in with the president and telling her, "I've done this, and I've done this, and I've done this." And you know, "Is this okay?" or "I hope this is okay," and "Will you check with the board?" And many organizations, not just ours, operated on people who were making decisions in good faith that in a time of no crisis they would never have done that without clearing it through a committee or a board, and in some cases there would have been months of discussion, and there was no time for that.

It was interesting.

M.O'R.: You mentioned that there were acts of heroism on the parts of many individuals out here. I'm wondering if you have any examples that spring readily to mind?

D.B.: Oh, when I say heroism, I don't mean that people put their lives at stake, but things that happened and people who were rational just made a decision and they kind of - I'll give you a couple of illustrations.

One, in our powerhouse the water rose above the level of the floor. It rose about 20 feet above the level of the floor in the powerhouse. So the water was coming in - we have some very high windows that are way off the ground up high in the air, and the water was actually lapping at the sills of those windows. But at the door to the powerhouse the water was maybe four or five feet above the bottom of the doorjamb, and so what we had done is the City kept bringing sandbags down to us, and we had built a sandbag wall, and we had pumps operating inside the powerhouse so that the water was coming in but we were pumping it out as fast as it was coming in. And we had guys working in effect 20 feet under water in the powerhouse. If the water started spilling in, it would have filled the powerhouse with 20 feet of water and ruined all of our turbines and equipment. But these guys were fighting to keep the water out. They had four or five lines coming in the door.

Well, one of the lines pulled the sandbag wall over in one place, and the water began pouring in to the inside of the wall and then of course across the transom and down into the powerhouse. It was spilling over like a waterfall. And one of the young men, he actually was a junior in high school, realized what was happening, and he scrambled up the ladder, the water was coming in directly over his body and into his face, and he scrambled up the ladder, and he ran to the point and he put the sandbags back in again to

stop the water from coming in, like the Dutch boy that got his finger in the dike to save the town on the other side.

Well, I guess the heroism is that he figured out very quickly - when all these adults were down there, you know, not knowing exactly what to do, this guy figured it out in a nanosecond and saved the day for us. Otherwise, we would have had 20 feet inside that powerhouse within the next 10, 15 minutes.

I think that Stu Dunis cutting the flume line is - realizing what had to be done, and even though his job was to protect the structure, saying, "Don, we've got to do this." I concurred with him, but you know, from his experiences and so forth he saw the need to do that, and much more senior people than he, you know, it hadn't quite occurred to them.

When I say heroism, I guess heroism in the decision that they made. Our stop logs out here in front of the dam, we have some floating logs, and when this flood fight was underway and the water came up higher and higher and we realized it was going to go over the top of the dam, a young man who worked for Lannie's Marine next door realized that those stop logs were blocking the flow of water over the dam because they were being pressed up against the dam. He jumped in our work boat, grabbed a couple of our employees, and here they were in this boat, it's a high-powered boat, but it was entirely reliant upon its engine, and he would back down towards the dam where the flow was going over something fierce, and get a chain around those logs with the water pummeling over the dam, and he's working right on the brink of the top of the dam, got a chain on them and then tried to yank them off and away from that area. Got two of them out of there, the third one got jammed.

People climbed out on that catwalk, and they had life preservers on and we had ropes on them, but it was pretty flimsy - I mean, if that thing had gone, those guys would have been hurt

badly or killed, but anyway, they actually cut those things. They were like three feet under water, and they had a chainsaw with a long reach, and they were able to get down there and cut those logs up with this chainsaw and get chains around them and yank them out of there with the power boat. That's the kind of thing I'm talking about.

M.O'R.: I imagine you'd have to be skilled and still have to take a risk to operate a chainsaw under such conditions, too.

D.B.: Yeah, you're standing on top of a catwalk across the dam that the water is surging over, and then down underneath you is the water, and then three feet below that, or actually maybe two feet below that is the log that you've got to cut to get out of there. When you're paying someone not too much more than minimum wage and they undertake that kind of a project, it's just a good thing that OSHA wasn't involved; if they had seen this stuff going on, they would have gone ballistic. But it was just the kind of things that were happening during those events. These are not normal operating times.

Well, there was \$20 million worth of damage around the lake, and that's a lot of money.

M.O'R.: You said earlier that there were maybe a couple of decisions that were made that turned out to be mistakes. Do any of those stand out in your mind?

D.B.: Yeah, one in particular. The City of Lake Oswego came by; they were trying to figure out how to get water out of here, too, and they suggested that one way to do it would be to cut a channel through our parking lot, kind of at the end of our dam, and that water then would exit through the channel. It seemed like a good idea at the time, and so we authorized it. The City had a backhoe, and they began to dig a channel from McVey back towards

our boat launching ramp area, and they dug the channel maybe four feet deep.

As they were digging the channel of course they dug through our water line, and then they dug a little farther and they dug through our sewer line, and they dug a little farther and they dug through our electric line, and they dug a little farther and then they hit the dam. Well, what I didn't know and they didn't know is that our dam, the surface that you see of the dam extends easterly towards this area, but then as it approaches this area it drops off and it goes maybe six inches underneath the asphalt is a continuation of the dam. So of course they were right at the very end of the dam, and there was concrete under there, and their equipment wasn't enough to get through that dam, but just enough to mess everything up.

Well, when the water did overtop, the channel didn't really help to exit water any faster, but what happened is the water that was coming over the parking lot area got into the channel, and of course the channel was now below the level of the asphalt. So instead of going right over the top of the asphalt and exiting out down below, it got into the channel and eroded out all the silt down in there, and then it began to erode in underneath the asphalt and eroded out to the west and destabilized a retaining wall that we had, and the retaining wall then gave way, irrigated big holes underneath our existing parking lot to the point where three boats that had remained parked in the lot fell as much as 10 feet down into this irrigated hole, destroyed all three boats, took out our retaining wall. We had an 8,000 gallon fuel tank above ground. It didn't fall into the hole, but it was destabilized by the hole next to it so it sank on one end. Fortunately it did not break the fuel lines.

Correcting that was probably - I'm not sure how much of the work we'd have to do with or without that creek area that had been created, but ultimately we poured 3- or \$400,000 into our parking lot and new underground fuel tanks and new retaining walls and new sewer lines and water lines and electrical service and all the other stuff that was involved. Of course it went right across our lot into MacVey and destroyed MacVey Avenue at this end of the bridge. I think the City had an \$80,000 bill repairing the street. So that was probably a mistake. [laughs]

M.O'R.: Sounds like it.

D.B.: Duane Klein was the supervisor of city maintenance services who suggested we do that, and with a certain degree of fondness we have called that Klein Creek that ran temporarily.

M.O'R.: Well, it's now recorded for history, which I'm sure he'll be happy about.

D.B.: So anyway, that was probably a bad decision.

M.O'R.: But obviously you don't have time to necessarily consider all the pro's and con's.

D.B.: Yeah, we made more good decisions than bad decisions, but that was a bad one. But we are much better equipped for the next event. We know it's going to come, but the next time around we've got a headgate which should hold. We've got additional discharge capacity. We've got a much stronger flume line that it will take a lot more than a flood like that to damage. We have flood insurance on our buildings now. We've done a lot of work down at the powerhouse. So when this occurs again I'm hoping it won't cost as much money to repair.

M.O'R.: What about you? You live right here on the lake; how were things at home during the flood?

D.B.: Oh, things on the home front were just great. Our house is above the level of the flood, so our home wasn't damaged.

We have a boathouse down on the lake, and when the flood came up I took a moment out and went over and put on my hip waders and walked out across my deck in about four feet of water and took my boat out of the slip because what was happening was the boat was rising, and had it continued to rise it would have pushed the windshield right up through the roof of the boathouse. That did happen a lot around the lake.

So anyway, I took the boat out and tied it actually in an area where when the lake started coming down again it would have been up on dry land, but then I took some time off again and kind of pushed it around and got it back in the boathouse, and then it lowered back into the boathouse just fine. So everything was waterlogged and damaged that was in the boathouse, but there was not a lot of damage. I fared a lot better than almost everybody else I know. There are other people whose whole houses - I mean we have a number of people who had a quarter million dollars' worth of damage. Terrible losses.

M.O'R.: Yeah, it sounds pretty bad.

D.B.: It was. We don't want a repeat of this.

M.O'R.: Anything else to say about the flood?

D.B.: No. Well, there is one area which I think is worthy of a brief comment, and that is Lake Oswego Corporation felt very strongly that there should be a hydrology study in the Tualatin, and particularly when we weren't allowed to build our headgate any higher than it already is. We felt it was important that all of the agencies and communities get together and either sponsor themselves or cause the Corps of Engineers or some other entity to do a hydrology study to determine the probabilities of this happening again, what can we do in the Tualatin Basin to reduce the damages that these kinds of events cause, make recommendations for preventing floods in the future.

It was very interesting: All of these little communities who would object to us putting in a higher headgate to protect ourselves, they didn't want to put in 10 cents to study this hydrology study. It wasn't their bull that was gored, and they on the one hand said no, they're not going to allow us to put up the kind of structure that we can protect ourselves, but they also didn't want to put up any money to mount a hydrology study. I mean, the damages from this flood were enormous, and we think they've got their head in the sand. We're not even a part of that basin, and it's not the kind of thing that we have any authority on.

[End of Tape 6, Side 1]

DON BURDICK

TAPE 6, Side 2

November 14, 1996

D.B.: It's not the kind of thing we have any authority on, but those that do have the authority, the flood is over, and they're on to the next event.

So I think that's a frustrating outcome of this for us is that we know it's going to happen again, and what surprises me is that an organization in the private sector is more concerned about the public good than the municipalities, particularly the City of Tualatin and the City of River Grove. The private sector is more concerned than the public sector about protecting the public, and I find that an anomaly.

M.O'R.: It's interesting, too, because as you say it's your bull that was gored, so to speak, but they had some pretty serious flooding in Tualatin, as well.

D.B.: Well, they did. They had tremendous losses. We talked to McKillop, the City Engineer over there, and it's like talking to a piece of Teflon.

M.O'R.: You said that your ability to build a higher headgate was frustrated by these communities?

D.B.: Well, it requires their approval to build higher, and they wouldn't give their approval.

M.O'R.: What difference would it make to them if the headgate were higher?

D.B.: They would have an additional four inches of flooding.

M.O'R.: Oh, I see.

D.B.: If the same event were to occur again, Tualatin would suffer from four additional inches. We would be protected, but instead of them getting whatever they got, let's say eight feet in

the downtown, they'd get eight feet four inches. But we would completely eliminate the flood damage here in Lake Oswego.

M.O'R.: And your headgate would be how much higher?

D.B.: Well, the headgate currently is 113.6, and that's what it was before the flood, as well. That's all the higher we can build. The flood was 120.2, and we originally designed to build 121 feet.

M.O'R.: Okay. And that would cause a four-inch rise in the river?

D.B.: In effect we would hold it - the 120.2 would become - I don't know - 120.6 or .7, and that would cause additional height rise in the Tualatin River at that point, and then decreasing as you go up the stream and decreasing as you go down the stream.

M.O'R.: Although of course the river could still flow downstream over your dam there, right?

D.B.: Well, the river would continue to flow downstream, but in effect there was approximately 30,000 cubic feet of water per second passing by at that location, but 5100 of that was diverted into our canal because we're too low. That 5100 would stay inside the Tualatin River.

M.O'R.: And cause the river to rise four inches in the nearby communities, then?

D.B.: Exactly. One of the arguments we mounted was, well, hey look: our canal is not a natural canal. It's a man-made canal. I mean, if you were to go back to the way things were 150 years ago, there's no canal there. So all we wanted to do was return it to its pre human improvement status by going up to 121 feet; that is the level of the surrounding ground.

But their argument is no, when the flood plains were established in this country, they were established on the way things are at the time the measure was taken, and at the time the measure was

taken, the headgate was there. So it's a part of the basis on which the flood plains are determined. And that's an argument, we've been told, if we argued it we would lose. So I don't know that to be true; we haven't argued it.

But my feeling about the hydrology study is when the next flood occurs and everybody gets all damage, and this time the Tualatin will suffer again tremendous damages, we hopefully will suffer less because of the things we've done for mitigation, maybe they'll listen the second time or the third time, or maybe they'll change administrators, or maybe it will happen so far in the future that this event will have been forgotten until someone pulls out this tape and says, "You know, those guys back there in '96, they're right. We should do a hydrology study on the Tualatin."

M.O'R.: Anything else about the flood?

D.B.: No. No, I think we may have exhausted the topic.

M.O'R.: You know, there's one loose end I would like to pick up here. It's a trivial point compared to what we've been discussing for the last hour-and-a-half, but you brought it up a couple of times in the interview, made reference to it, and it's something that I haven't heard much conversation on, so if you could talk about it for a minute or two, I'd appreciate it. That is you mentioned that the high tech industry that's gone in out in the valley is making its own contributions to pollution of the river that I believe you said you could see here in some of your measurements. This is an opinion that is not too widely expressed. It seems like what I usually hear is that they recycle the water at these chip-making facilities and that they also have their own treatment of it and that their discharges are fairly clean. So I'm wondering what do you see as a result of the high tech industry and what do you think are concerns there?

D.B.: Well, I think the high tech industry is a wonderful addition to our region. I probably have some opinions that with full employment we don't need to provide incentives to these big plants to come into our region. I mean, look at the traffic in Washington County, and in our own community, everywhere. I mean, you can hardly move around; it's like gridlock here. And the idea of bringing more in and giving them these tremendous tax advantages, I just don't see it because I'm the guy who has to pay higher taxes because they pay less taxes. But I guess that's an entirely different argument than the water argument.

The water argument is that whether it be high tech or any other industry, when they come in and they build impervious surfaces, there's fewer places for that water to go, so there's more water that gets into the stream flow, and it gets in there faster.

That's why the Tualatin is beginning to flash, and by flash I mean the front side of the bell curve that the river levels have when they rise - it's a kind of a bell curve shape; over time they rise up and then they peak and then they come back down again on the back side of the bell curve. But the front ends of those bell curves are becoming steeper and steeper with each event, and in effect the rivers are flashing because there's not as much absorption into the soils because they've built all these surfaces. It's the building, it's the parking lot, it's the roads, it's the houses for people and the retail that serves them and all the other things that go with development. So more water gets into the streams and faster.

The other problem I have accompanying that is in the summer months, there's not enough water. This seems strange, but there's not enough water to supply these industries. They're big users of water, and they need quality water. So there are a number of moves

afoot right now where they're building systems which will take water from the Coast Range, which would ordinarily flow down the Wilson River, for example, and they're building tunnels through the mountains, and they want that water to flow into the Tualatin Basin. That's true on the Trask - I said Wilson, but I meant the Trask River - and there's another new project going in that's going to bring I think it's 48 million cubic feet per day into the Tualatin Basin. A brand new big dam whose name escapes me, but ...

M.O'R.: Is this the expansion of the Barney Reservoir?

D.B.: Yeah, the Barney Reservoir. So now we have not only our own rainfall to cope with in these events, but we also have all this water that's being imported and is exacerbating the problem. There's an incremental disadvantage during flood events to bringing all that water in because it's got to go someplace.

The other concern I have is that the discharges from these plants is worse than the water they take in; they degrade the quality of the water. The water coming out of those plants is not better than what goes into the plant. That water is used to wash off all kinds of things, including toxins. Now, I'm not saying that the toxic contaminants in those waters is dangerous to human life at the levels that they're predicting, but I am saying that that water coming out of those plants is dirtier than the water that goes into those plants because that water is used for cleansing.

So the Unified Sewerage Agency has a number of concerns about this, and there's a lot of testing going on, and "Oh, yes, you're safe," and so on. Maybe you're safe with each individual plant, if it's monitored on a regular basis, but are you really safe when there's 20 plants or 50 plants or 100 or a 1,000 plants that are all bringing in pretty clean water and discharging dirtier water?

I think it's contaminating the system, and it will continue to do so.

I think that what we're going to discover five years, ten years is that we have maybe shot ourselves in the foot in terms of trying to continue progress on cleaning up the Tualatin because of the nature of industry out there being unable to clean up after itself, and it's just going to discharge dirty water into the system, and I'll bet water quality degrades over the next few years.

The answer to this, of course, at the extreme that it becomes so bad that someone mounts a suit similar to what Northwest Environmental Defense Council did in the Jack Churchill case, and they sue to cause the EPA to enforce the clean water standards, and until such time as those are accomplished, they put a moratorium on building permits in Washington County. I mean, to me that is the real threat.

Now, that's an extreme which I hope will not be reached, but it is a temporary solution to this increasing problem of water degradation.

Now you're getting political comments instead of actually what happened during the flood fight, but ...

But it's very tough to try and preserve the environment where man wants to place himself in great concentrations. This is a wonderful area to live, and there's a lot of people who want to come up here. One of the few saving graces that we have is the urban growth boundaries. I think that urban growth boundaries are going to be tested for a long time, but I hope they stay in place because it's one of the biggest protections we have. I think we can deal better with focusing our efforts in concentrated areas rather than allowing urban growth sprawl to just run rampant throughout our tri-county area.

M.O'R.: I think you're right, personally. Two final questions.

D.B.: Sure.

M.O'R.: One is is there anything else that you can think of that relates to the history of the lake or the Tualatin that we haven't talked about yet?

D.B.: Oh, gosh, I don't know where to begin, and I don't want to go on forever.

M.O'R.: Okay. Is there any topic that we have discussed that you'd like to return to?

D.B.: No. This has been very interesting for me, and in many ways the manner in which you have led me through a recollection of my experiences has allowed me to kind of summarize and put into focus many of the things I've gone through the last several months, and in a way I appreciate that.

M.O'R.: Well, I'm glad to be of service. And of course the interview will be available to you and your family if you wish.

D.B.: Well, I think I probably one day would be interested in going down and saying, "My god, did I really do all those things back in '96?"

M.O'R.: Well, I want to thank you very much.

Actually, you told me a couple of stories at the end of our session last time about your grandfather that we didn't tape, and I thought they were amusing stories. About the robberies?

D.B.: Yeah, the two robberies. There was one I didn't tell, too. I'll tell you about the two robberies in a second, but I'll just tell you one that occurs to me at this moment. There was a friend of my grandfather whose name was Moody, and Moody had a tavern here in Lake Oswego. Bill Blizzard was the editor of the *Lake Oswego Review*, and in those days lawsuits for libel were few

and far between; you could say a lot of things that you can't say today.

My grandfather told me this story; this tavern was a pretty sleazy place, I guess, that Moody ran, and so Bill Blizzard reported in the *Lake Oswego Review* that there had been some kind of a fight down at Moody's joint. That was the word in the newspaper, and Moody took great exception to that and wrote a letter to the editor and said, "How dare you call my establishment 'a joint'? I demand an immediate apology." So Bill Blizzard in his wisdom wrote back and said, "Moody's right, and I apologize for calling Moody's dump a joint."

But the two stories about my grandfather's bank, about those robberies, was one time there was a group - it was about the time that Dillinger was running around the country and robbing banks, and there were a lot of wannabe's. And one of the wannabe's talked about it and the sheriff here in Lake Oswego got wind of this proposed robbery of my grandfather's bank. And the sheriff came over and told my grandfather and his staff about it, and he said, "Now, don't you worry. We know this is going to happen, and it's supposed to be at three o'clock tomorrow, so you just go about your business, and we'll take care of this."

So they were all nervous, you know, because the robbers were going to come at 3:00 was the word that had leaked out. And sure enough, right before 3:00 this big car pulls up in front of the bank, and there's three guys in the car. But by this time the police department had organized itself with a couple of the local citizens deputized, and so as it pulls up to the curb, the police and the deputies just walk up and they have shotguns. In those days everybody around here had a shotgun; there was a lot of bird hunting going on. And they just walked right up to the car and

pointed their shotguns in through the windows and asked these men if they could help them.

So I guess they helped them out of the car, and these guys were armed, and it was the group, and they were prepared to rob my grandfather's bank, but they never quite got to that point.

M.O'R.: Were they arrested?

D.B.: I don't know the story beyond that. I just have always been amused by the idea of deputizing, you know, local folk. This was in the late 20's. Deputizing the local folk and, you know, walking up to a car with shotguns like that, and here's the big tough robbers inside, no place to go, and four or five kind of country boy farmers looking at them.

The other story about the bank, though, there actually was a robbery, and there was a guy who was a frequent - who was a good friend of my grandfather's, and he was frequently in the bank. His name was Peanuts Ditson. I never did know his first name, but everybody called him Peanuts. He always had a lot of money on him. Everybody thought he was the guy who was going to get robbed some day.

M.O'R.: And did you know Peanuts personally?

D.B.: Yeah, he was elderly when I knew him as a kid. But anyway, the story goes that my grandfather was the guy in the bank at that time, and the robbery occurred, and the robbers put him inside the vault and closed the door and spun the wheel.

So shortly thereafter Peanuts comes wandering into the bank, and my grandfather is yelling out, you know, "Get me out of here! Get me out of here!" and Peanuts says, "Charlie, is that you in there?"

He says, "Yeah. Get me out of here."

And Peanuts says, "Well, what should I do?"

And my grandfather said, "Go around to the front of the vault and spin that wheel."

So Peanuts did that, and he says, "It's not doing any good. What do I have to do?"

He says, "Well, you've got to turn the combination."

So Peanuts says, "Well, what's the combination?"

And my grandfather said, "You know, I stopped because I didn't want to tell him the combination to the vault. But on the other hand, I was inside the vault."

So he says, "Well, you've got to promise to keep it a secret."

And Peanuts said, "I'll keep it a secret. Just tell me how to get you out of here."

So my grandfather said, "I had to say it, and I said it just loud enough so he'd hear, and hopefully there was no one else in the bank." And he spun the wheel and got him out of there. And he says, "I knew him real well, but I always knew there was at least one more person that knew the combination than me. I was nervous forever after that."

M.O'R.: The question is did Peanuts have a good memory or did he run over to the desk ...

D.B.: Oh, Peanuts was a good guy. He wasn't going to use the information like that.

M.O'R.: Well, thank you very much for the interview. It's been, I think, a very valuable addition to the project, and I'm really glad that we were able to connect on this.

D.B.: I'm glad, too. Thank you, Michael.

M.O'R.: Thanks a lot.

[End of Tape 6, Side 2]