Explanation of START and "Build-Down" charts prepared by Congressman Les AuCoin.

STARTing Dangerous New Soviet Weapons

The Administration has offered what it calls a Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty to the Soviet Union. This proposal calls for reducing ballistic missile warheads to 5000 on each side, of which no more than 2500 can be on land-based ICBMs. The proposal includes a "Build-Down" schedule under which warheads would be reduced 5% per year until the START levels were reached.

The central defect in START/Build-Down is that it limits the numbers of weapons without limiting their destabilizing first-strike qualities. Of these qualities, the most important are accuracy and surprise.

In contrast, by prohibiting flight testing of all ballistic missiles, the nuclear freeze would make significant qualitative improvements impossible.

Chart I illustrates the sharp build-up which can and will occur under Build-Down. It measures first-strike capability, year by year, with current capability assigned the value of 100. The lower line represents the advertised effect of the 5% reduction in whrheads. But the upper line considers both accuracy and warheads in combination, and shows what would really happen to first-strike capability under START and Build-Down. This chart assumes a 10% annual improvement in accuracy, which is consistent with historical experience.

Chart II compares the effect of the Freeze and Build-Down on real expected Soviet weapons. The weapons considered here are submarine-launched ballistic missiles, because they have the shortest distance to travel and can strike with the most effective surprise. Current Soviet capability is assigned the value of 1.

Chart III shows the effect of Soviet first strike capability upon U.S. survivable deterrent warheads. It assumes the Soviets attack each U.S. ICBM silo with two of their best warheads. For the two 1996 cases, the chart assumes all U.S. silos are made five times as hard(strong) as they are today. Under the Build-Down case, the chart assumes the advertised Reagan plan is completed, and we build 100 MX and 500 Midgetman ICBMs. As this chart demonstrates the net result of the Administration's weapons and arms control program is to take the "window" of ICBM vulnerability and open it further, while the result of the nuclear freeze is to close it without paying a cent for new weapons.

Build - Down's Build - UP



Soviet Quick-Strike Hard-Target Kill Power

1983 1996 1996 Under Nuclear Under "Build-Down" Freeze And Start

U.S. Deterrent ICBM Warheads Surviving Soviet Attack

